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ABSTRACT: The main purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of ‘strategic moves’ (or 
strategic change) on the likelihood of organizational survival in a population of firms which 
has undergone radical transformations in its environment. To this end, we propose and test 
two competitive hypotheses which are the result of two other theoretical perspectives about 
the consequences of strategic change: the adaptation view (classic strategic management and 
dynamic capabilities) and the ecological approach. While from the former, in general, it is 
assumed that strategic change has a positive effect on the likelihood of organizational 
survival, from the ecological approach, it is frequently argued that attempts at reorganization 
in general and strategic change in particular tend to be associated with an increase in the 
likelihood of organizational extinction. The sample used to test the two proposed hypotheses 
is the Spanish bank population over the period 1983-1997. The results confirm the positive 
and significant effect of strategic moves (or strategic change) on the likelihood of 
organizational survival, in line with the conclusions of the adaptive perspective and other 
empirical research carried out in different settings. This paper introduces two important 
methodological innovations: (a) the definition and measurement of ‘strategic moves’ (or 
strategic change) by using a new cluster algorithm, the MCLUST; and (b) the control of the 
non-observable heterogeneity using panel data models for ‘probit’ regression. 
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 1
INTRODUCTION 
In the last twenty years most of the industries in developed countries have been 
undergoing drastic transformations in their environments. Industries currently in 
the throes of these upheavals include telecommunications, airline and trucking 
transportation, health care, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and financial services 
in general. In each of these settings rapid and radical environmental changes are 
restructuring industries, relocating their boundaries, and changing the bases of 
competition. In particular, the influence of technological, socio-economic and 
regulatory changes and the subsequent globalization process has been a threshold 
in the evolution of competitive structure in these industries in relation to previous 
decades, mainly in the 1950s, 1960s, and the greater part of the 1970s. Throughout 
the previous period of relative environmental stability, the interest of scholars and 
businessmen was dominated by a focus on the potential explanatory factors of 
organizational success and growth (e.g., Penrose, 1959; Peters and Waterman, 
1982; Starbuck, 1965). However, environmental conditions have changed 
substantially since the end of the 1970s. As a result of these drastic environmental 
changes, the main challenge which is currently faced by scholars and businessmen 
is trying to identify those factors associated with organizational survival and 
extinction (e.g., Daily, 1994; Sutton, 1987, 1990; Whetten, 1980, 1987). 
Furthermore, in these highly turbulent environments, traditionally in organizational 
literature it has frequently been argued that an organization’s survival depends 
increasingly on devising new competitive strategic responses (e.g., Hambrick and 
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D’Aveni, 1988; Meyer et al., 1990; Porter, 1991; Weitzel and Jonsson, 1989), 
although at the moment there is still no agreement among researchers on the 
regular effect of strategic change on organizational survival. In fact, researchers 
seem to vary greatly in the extent to which they adopt an adaptive or inertial view 
of strategic change on organizational survival and extinction. At one extreme, 
those who support the predominance of strategic adaptation emphasize the role that 
managers play in monitoring environmental changes and modifying organizational 
strategy to better match new environmental contingencies (Boeker, 1997, p. 153; 
Child, 1972). The most important finding from the adaptive perspective is that 
strategic change generally benefits survival chances if it occurs in response to a 
profound shift of environmental conditions (Haveman, 1992; Miles and Snow, 
1994; Smith and Grimm, 1987; Zajac et al., 2000). At the other extreme, theorists 
adopting a more inertial view of strategy propose that although adaptive strategic 
change is not impossible, it is severely constrained due to a great variety of internal 
and external forces. Furthermore, given that the process of attempting strategic 
reorganization tends to lower the reliability of performance (Hannan and Freeman, 
1984, p. 159), it is frequently argued that it may finally turn out to be detrimental 
to survival chances as a result of the high vulnerability of organizations undergoing 
this strategic change to environmental shocks (Carroll, 1984a; Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977, 1984, 1989).  
The main purpose of this paper is to analyse the effect of ‘strategic mobility’ 
on the likelihood of organizational survival when it occurs as a response to relevant 
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changes in the environmental conditions. We examine this question in the light of 
the available evidence of the Spanish bank population, which has experienced very 
important technological, economic and regulatory shifts over a 15-year period 
(from 1983 to 1997). Thus, this paper adds to the line of research investigating the 
occurrence of strategic changes in organizational populations and their 
consequences on organizational survival (e.g., Amburgey et al., 1993; Delacroix 
and Swaminathan, 1991; Haveman, 1992; Kelly and Amburgey, 1991; Ruef, 1997; 
Sheppard, 1994; Singh et al., 1986; Stoeberl et al., 1998; Zajac and Kraatz, 1993; 
Zajac et al., 2000) and it contributes in three major aspects. First, we add new non-
trivial evidence to the available studies since the Spanish banking system, as is the 
case with most European Union (EU) countries, differs widely in its institutional 
and regulatory issues from the U.S. case. In this context, it is usual to distinguish 
between two banking systems (e.g., Gardener, 1992): bank-based systems (such as 
those found in Spain, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium or Japan) 
and more market-based systems (as in the U.S. and U.K., the so-called ‘Anglo-
Saxon systems’). In the first category, banks have been traditionally more strongly 
oriented towards the corporate sector. In addition, the public sector has played a 
very important role in the building process of the financial system (this is what has 
occurred in Spain, France or Italy). On the other hand, in market-based systems the 
most open capital markets have been more important sources of long-term 
corporate funding and the role of the government has been less important than in 
the bank-based systems. Second, we propose the concept of strategic mobility to 
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quantitatively approximate the event of strategic change in order to gain objectivity 
and to benefit from the advantages of the recent developments in qualitative 
response models for panel data analysis. Third, the length of the period examined 
captures an outstanding example of successive and transcendental environmental 
changes at regulatory, technological and economic level. From mid-eighties to late 
nineties, Spanish banks have witnessed the entry of Spain into the former EEC, the 
rise and spread of IT innovations in the banking industry and the ongoing 
globalization of financial markets.  
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, the extant theoretical 
and empirical literature on the relationship between strategic change and 
organizational survival is briefly reviewed in order to propose two alternative 
hypotheses according to divergent theoretical approaches about the effect of 
strategic change on the probability of organizational extinction. We describe the 
sample and provide a new research methodology for testing the hypotheses in the 
third section. The results are presented in the fourth section. In the last section, we 
discuss the conclusions, implications, and shortcomings of our study and we 
suggest possible avenues for future research.  
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The Adaptation View: Classic Strategic Management and Dynamic 
Capabilities 
Prior to the late 1970s, almost all researchers examined strategy and strategic 
change under the common belief that top managers could implement rational 
strategies in a relatively quick and flexible way even when facing substantial 
environmental changes (Andrews, 1971; Child, 1972). Furthermore, this change in 
organizational strategy was considered as an essential condition to ensure 
organizational survival over time. Nowadays, there are two basic approaches that 
share these same concerns regarding the consequences and effects of strategic 
change on organizational survival: classic strategic management and dynamic 
capabilities. Other theoretical approaches traditionally interested in exploring in a 
tacit or explicit way the potential benefits of an adaptive behaviour are the 
contingency approach (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967), the 
resource dependence theory (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978) and the institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987) 1. 
The central tenet of classic strategic management (Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 
1965; Chandler, 1962; Porter, 1980, 1985) is that strategic change is considered as 
a frequent event and, what is more, it happens in a relatively quick and flexible 
way. Organizations must maintain a proper alignment with their institutional and 
industrial environments. In this sense, to the extent that top managers can 
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accurately enact the transformations in organizational environmental conditions, 
they should act by changing the strategies of the organizations which they manage 
(Andrews, 1971; Child, 1972; Smith and Grimm, 1987). The main theoretical 
reason for justifying this behaviour of top managers is that relevant environmental 
shifts may result in misalignments between an organization and its environment, 
reducing the effectiveness of its current strategy. Generally, this lack of 
organizational effectiveness forces top managers to improve alignment (Friesen 
and Miller, 1986; Ginsberg, 1988).  
On the other hand, the dynamic capabilities approach (Teece and Pisano, 1994; 
Teece et al., 1990, 1997) explicitly reckons that undertaking relevant strategic and 
structural changes is constrained because of the ‘path-dependent’ process of 
capabilities creation and deployment. A firm’s strategy is rooted in competences 
and capabilities which must be internally built and, therefore, may simultaneously 
be sources of change and rigidity in organizations (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Teece et 
al., 1997). However, it is usually assumed that the costs and limitations coupled 
with strategic change do not preclude successful adaptation when adopting best 
practices through a constant surveillance of different market segments. This should 
necessarily force internal adjustments to quickly accomplish strategic 
reconfiguration and transformation ahead of the competition (Teece et al., 1997, p. 
521). Essentially, from this approach, the environment is viewed as a trigger of 
strategic change but also as a selection device that precludes the survival of 
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organizations lacking the required resources and capabilities to face the new 
environmental conditions (Teece et al., 1990, p. 18). 
The results of different longitudinal empirical studies made over the last fifteen 
years seem to support the existence of a positive and significant relationship 
between the strategic change process and organizational survival when 
organizations face substantial environmental shifts. In this vein, Smith and Grimm 
(1987), on a sample of 27 U.S. railroads, found that those firms that changed their 
strategies in response to environmental variation (deregulation) out-performed 
those that did not. Zajac and Kraatz (1993) corroborated that restructuring is a 
performance-enhancing response to changing environmental conditions in the US 
higher education system. Singh et al., (1986), on a population of voluntary social 
service organizations that came into existence in metropolitan Toronto, Canada, 
during the period 1970-1980, and Amburgey et al., (1993), on a population of 
1,001 Finnish newspaper organizations over 193 years, found that strategic 
changes generally caused a decrease in the hazard of organizational failure. More 
specifically focused on the banking industry, the U.S. evidence of Haveman (1992) 
and Zajac et al., (2000) concluded that strategic changes of savings and loans 
institutions frequently enhanced financial performance and simultaneously 
diminished failure rates if they occurred in response to drastic environmental 
shifts.  
Consequently, according to the above arguments we formulate the following 
statement: 
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Hypothesis 1: Strategic moves in organizations will imply an increase in the 
likelihood of organizational survival under relevant shifts of environmental 
conditions. 
The Ecological Approach: The Structural Inertia Model 
This stream of research for studying organizational behaviour emerged in the 
late 1970s (Aldrich, 1979; Hannan and Freeman, 1977) and is generally 
characterised by a quite ‘pessimistic’ view of the organizational change process in 
comparison to the ‘optimistic’ perspective that underlies the adaptation perspective 
(Narayanan and Nath, 1993, p. 142; Montgomery, 1995, p. 251). Hannan and 
Freeman (1984) set up the bases of their structural inertial model in their seminal 
paper ‘Structural Inertia and Organizational Change’. Their main thesis is that 
organizations are highly inert because of two kinds of competences: organizational 
reliability and accountability (Hannan and Freeman, 1984, p. 153). Organizational 
strategy –a core feature of organizations– is seen as fixed at its inception and as 
unchanging over time (Freeman and Boeker, 1984, p. 71). Once it is fixed no 
further room is left for the top managers. In this sense, as McKelvey (1982) and 
others (Robbins, 1990, p. 166) suggest, “Managers are perceived as impotent 
observers. If there is a shift in the environmental niche that the organization 
occupies, there is little that management can do”. And although companies 
sometimes manage to change their strategies to fit with new environmental 
conditions, such reorientations are both rare and costly and seem to expose an 
organization to greatly increased risk of death. Furthermore, Haveman (1992, p. 
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48) claims that organizations may be obliged to divert resources from operating to 
reorganizing in case of strategic change, reducing the efficiency of organizational 
operations. Finally, this may render performance less reliable and thereby hurt 
survival chances2. These theoretical arguments have been supported by several 
longitudinal empirical studies during the last decade. For example, Parnell’s (1998) 
study on a sample of 110 firms in the department store industry in the US. found 
that strategic change is no more likely to improve performance than strategic 
consistency. Also Sheppard (1994), using a sample composed of firms from 
different US industries, and Ruef (1997) with a population of US hospitals, 
corroborated a significant and negative relationship between strategic change and 
the likelihood of organizational survival. In summary, and according to all these 
arguments and findings, we can state the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: Strategic moves in organizations will imply a decrease in the 
likelihood of organizational survival under relevant shifts of environmental 
conditions. 
METHODS 
Sample Selection and Data Collection 
The sample used for empirical testing is the total population of Spanish banks 
from 1983 to 1997. The most important reasons for this choice were the following. 
Firstly, previous empirical studies carried out on the Spanish banking system have 
found heterogeneous strategic patterns evolving over time (e.g., Azofra and 
Fuente, 1987; Más, 1998; Vives, 1990) but none of them have examined the 
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potential effect of changes in these patterns on the likelihood of banking survival 
as has been done in other countries. In this sense, it can be claimed that the 
institutional peculiarities of the Spanish economy may pose some caveats to 
comparative analysis with available evidence in other countries (e.g., Haveman, 
1992; Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991; Zajac et al., 2000). Nonetheless, it is also true 
that our resulting evidence can contribute to assessing the impact of institutional 
differences in our research object. Available evidence on the impact of 
deregulation and liberalization in medium-size developed economies such as the 
Spanish one is scarce despite its interest as a privileged scenario for analysing 
strategic change. As is to be expected, large and highly developed economies like 
that of the US are likely to exhibit more consolidated institutional contexts and 
more experienced economic actors capable of accomplishing adaptation to a 
changing environment. However, the impact of market liberalization on medium-
size economies in terms of strategic behaviour is more uncertain as organizations 
can adopt a broader range of strategies depending upon their perception of the 
deregulation process: as a threat or as an opportunity. Secondly, the financial 
services industry plays a major role in market economies. Nowadays, its degree of 
complexity and effectiveness is usually considered a good indicator of economic 
development. In addition, the banking sector is profoundly interlinked with other 
industries not only because of its role as financial dealer, channelling funds from 
the last savers to the last borrowers, but also owing to their function as an active 
shareholder in ‘bank-oriented’ economies such as those of most countries of 
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western continental Europe. From this point of view, the strategic behaviour and 
the survival or disappearance of several firms of this industry may have important 
consequences for the remaining sectors of economic activity in every country. 
Thirdly, after a long period of relative environmental stability, in the early 1980s 
this scenario changed because very relevant shifts started to occur in the Spanish 
financial services industry and particularly, in the population of banking 
institutions. Before the 1980s, the Spanish banking system was closed, heavily 
regulated in terms of interest rates, entry, branching, investments and reserve 
requirements as well as characterized by a low concern with innovation. Many of 
these regulations put different constraints on different financial services 
institutions such as saving and loans institutions and foreign banks, for example. 
Although the deregulation and liberalization process in Spain advanced 
significantly in the 1970s, it has recently accelerated, mainly after joining the 
European Community in 1986. From this date many legal restrictions were 
progressively suppressed. Furthermore, financial agents and markets have been 
involved in concurrent phenomena that have substantially disrupted the 
competitive structure of this industry, such as the increasing globalization of 
financial markets, the disintermediation process, the emergence of new 
competition from other activity sectors, the rapid spread of new information 
technologies, and finally the increasing level of rivalry among the different 
providers of financial products and services. Table 1 summarizes some of the most 
important environmental changes between 1983 and 1997. 
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Insert Table 1 about here 
 
The combination of all the environmental changes undergone by the Spanish 
financial system has made it very difficult for the specific population of Spanish 
banks to achieve high profits and, finally, to continue surviving by sticking to their 
traditional competitive strategies. Banks have engaged in continuous efforts to 
launch new financial products and services for their traditional market segments 
without abandoning the search for opportunities in new market segments. All these 
shifts have resulted in an increasing competitive rivalry among banks, saving 
banks, foreign banks and other financial services firms that have recently emerged 
owing to the new opportunities arising from the deregulation process. 
Consequently, as competition increased, all the above environmental shifts created 
more pressure for the strategic restructuring of the financial services sector in 
general and for the strategic transformation of banking in particular. In fact, a very 
high number of firms have disappeared (liquidated, merged or acquired) over the 
whole period under analysis (about a third of the total number of banks). 
Therefore, it makes sense to find out to what extent strategic change has increased 
or decreased the likelihood of organizational survival in this population of firms.  
Our database contains information of yearly distributed data for 134 different 
banks spanning the period from 1983 to 1997. These banks represented the 
complete population of Spanish banks during this period. The resulting data panel 
includes longitudinal economic and financial indicators as well as other 
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organizational characteristics of these financial institutions. The total sample size 
comprised 1,257 observations3.  
Data used in our empirical study has been taken mainly from the yearly reports 
published by the Higher Council of Banking (CSB) and the Spanish Banking 
Association (AEB). These reports provide detailed balance sheet data from 1983 to 
1997, the dates of mergers and takeovers and the dates of dissolutions/liquidations. 
All data referred to the end of the corresponding year.  
Variables 
The test of our alternative hypotheses requires the assessment of the effect of 
strategic change on the likelihood of organizational survival. Thus, our two 
variables of interest are the dependent one, which is representative of 
organizational extinction, and an independent variable representing the strategic 
change. We also consider as controls additional explanatory factors that have been 
suggested in previous empirical research regarding both the inertia and adaptation 
perspectives. These variables were linked to some specific environmental 
characteristics of Spanish banks, firm-specific factors, and certain managerial 
dimensions.  
Variables of Interest 
Organizational Extinction: The dependent variable indicates the event of 
organizational extinction. This dichotomous variable is valued 1 if one of the three 
following conditions is satisfied: (a) a bank went into liquidation; (b) a bank is no 
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longer operative; and (c) there was a merger or takeover with another bank4. It 
takes a value of 0 otherwise.  
Strategic Change: The explanatory variable of interest in this research signals 
the strategic change as a discrete variable that we define as ‘strategic move’. This 
indicator takes a value of 1 for a given bank when it moves from one strategic 
group to another between consecutive ‘Strategic Stable Periods’, (SSTP hereafter) 
as they are defined by Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990). To compute this variable, 
first we had to choose the variables which reasonably captured the competitive 
banking strategy, and then to identify strategic groups in each SSTP.  
We agree with Cool and Schendel (1987, p. 1109), Fiegenbaum et al., (1990, p. 
136) and Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990, p. 198), that the specification of strategy 
variables normally depends on the industry under investigation and it requires a 
clear and thorough understanding of industry economics and the range of 
competitive strategies adopted by competing firms. For the population selected in 
this study, the competitive strategy may be associated with three different kinds of 
decisions: (a) the financial products and services offered by these banking firms; 
(b) the customers served; and (c) the scope commitments. Finally, according to 
Caminal et al., (1993) these decisions make up the competitive strategy of these 
financial entities in relation to their market segments. We reviewed previous 
research on banking and also interviewed banking executives in order to select the 
specific strategic variables. These dimensions are summarized in seven key 
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variables at a business level that were collected from the balance sheets. Here, our 
main assumption, in the line of previous research (e.g., Amel and Rhoades, 1988; 
Caminal et al., 1993; Más, 1998; Mehra, 1996; Passmore, 1986) is that the assets 
and liabilities composition of each bank can reasonably represent the different 
financial products and services offered in its market segments. Table 2 provides a 
summary of the strategic variables chosen and their interpretation in terms of 
strategic orientation. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
By observing the three strategic variables of assets (V1, V2 and V3) we can 
distinguish between three different types of Spanish financial institutions 
according to their capacity to provide financial funds. The first ones have a clear 
commercial inclination and their target segment is usually made up of households 
and different types of firms (Commercial Banking, which is associated with a large 
percentage of commercial loans: V1). The second kind appear to be industry-
oriented since they have significant investments in securities and their main target 
segment may be characterized by transactions in the stock markets (Investment 
Banking, which is related to a high proportion of securities portfolios: V2). The last 
types have an institutional calling and their main target segments are the financial 
markets in general (Institutional Banking, which is associated with a high 
percentage in treasury: V3). On the other hand, the four strategic variables of 
liability (V4, V5, V6 and V7) allow us to distinguish between three different types of 
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banking activities according to the means selected for obtaining their financial 
resources. In this sense, there are banks that have firms and households as primary 
market targets for accessing funds. Their basic services consist of issuing low-yield 
and stable liabilities which do not require intensive commercial or design efforts 
(Traditional Banking, which is associated with a great percentage of savings and 
deposits accounts: V4), or issuing liabilities which require larger resource 
investment in their sale and design (Innovative Banking, which is related to a high 
proportion of current accounts, but especially to other accounts: V5 and V6). 
Conversely, other Spanish banks heavily rely on the inter-bank market for 
obtaining funds (Credit-Debt Position in the financial system: V7). This takes 
positive values when a bank has a credit position and negative if it has a debt 
position in the inter-bank market. 
After selecting the above set of indicators as clustering variables, we followed 
the procedure of Cool and Schendel (1987), Fiegenbaum et al., (1990), 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990, 1993), and Más (1998) to identify strategic groups 
when longitudinal -time series- data are available. This required us to identify the 
periods of strategic homogeneity (SSTPs) in order to aggregate longitudinal data of 
individual banks within each SSTP. This method attempts to minimize the risk of 
aggregating “irregular” or heterogeneous observations at a longitudinal level. After 
identifying the SSTPs, we cluster the data within each SSTP into strategic groups .  
In this stage, we employed a recently developed technique, the Model-Based 
Clustering Method (MCLUST hereafter), as a grouping device (Banfield and 
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Raftery, 1993; Fraley and Raftery, 1998a). Although we provide further detail of 
this method further on, we will now advance some of the reasons that led us to this 
choice.  
The characteristics of our data and clustering variables will make it more likely 
to find a higher strategic instability (shorter SSTPs) than similar empirical studies 
for two main reasons. First, as the number of banks to be grouped increases, the 
potential number of strategic configurations also becomes greater. Our data base 
includes the whole population of Spanish banks over a 15-year period and thus, 
cross-sectional and longitudinal strategic variation is more likely in our research 
than in other studies with more restricted empirical samples, which would be 
expected to favour higher inter-firm homogeneity (e.g. Cool and Schendel, 1987; 
Fiengenbaum and Thomas, 1990, 1993; Más, 1998). Second, the set of clustering 
variables that we propose may reasonably capture the characterization of each bank 
in terms of its market positioning rather than other strategic dimensions such as 
those representing their goals, forms of authority, or technology. These ‘core 
characteristics’ (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) would eventually be more stable over 
time and should exhibit a lower cross-sectional variation than functional or 
competitive strategies such as those captured by our set of clustering variables. On 
the other hand, the longitudinal analysis of strategic change through conventional 
clustering methods becomes complicated by the fact that the position of a given 
strategic group as a whole can follow distinctive paths over time in the strategy 
space (i.e. the centroids of each SG are time-dependent). Although we could bind 
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the aggregate level of strategic mobility by considering some sub-samples of the 
total bank population, we discarded this procedure because of the potential 
‘selection sample bias’, which could severely distort the interpretation of the causal 
models of organizational extinction (i.e. conditional distributions of organizational 
survival can vary substantially depending upon the sample selected). Instead, we 
count on the advantages of MCLUST for identifying meaningful individual 
strategic repositioning by controlling the effect of the ‘aggregated’ strategic 
volatility. Under this approach, we would only consider that a bank exhibits a 
‘strategic move’ (or strategic change) when its individual drift ‘departs’ 
substantially from its former SG of reference over the strategy space.  
With this method, we control the effect of the joint movement of the SG as a 
whole when assessing the likelihood of strategy change for an individual bank. 
This procedure has quite useful properties, especially in a dynamic context in 
which a homogeneous (even though rapid) displacement of centroids of some SGs 
might be viewed as a regular pattern within the SG. Specifically, our method 
attempts to discriminate between two kinds of strategic displacements: (a) the joint 
movement over time of banks in the same SG; and (b) the significant departure of 
one or more banks from their former SG. We only consider as ‘strategic moves’ 
the latter one since the former represent a dimension of the regular pattern of 
strategic behaviour of banks within a given SG and, hence, it can be viewed as an 
inherent feature of SGs rather than an individual strategy attributable to a given 
bank. In this context, we assumed that a bank experienced a ‘strategic move’ if it 
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changed its position from one SG to another between two successive SSTPs. This 
follow-up of each bank over the period of study was used to calculate the 
independent variable of interest in our study, the strategic move (or strategic 
change). 
Still, the definition of ‘strategic move’ in a turbulent context in which both SGs 
and individual firms are moving over the strategy space is problematic. The 
MCLUST procedure provides a less discretionary basis than conventional 
clustering methods to approach this question by objectively determining the 
number and composition of clusters for each period. Unfortunately, the MCLUST 
fails to offer objective rules to find longitudinal links between the clustering results 
of consecutive periods. We addressed this shortcoming by examining the similarity 
among SGs from consecutive periods. Particularly, we identified two consecutive 
SGs as the same one when the Euclidean distance between their centroids was the 
lowest among all available SGs from successive periods. Nonetheless, this 
technical solution could still be viewed as an ‘ad hoc’ criterion that may obscure 
the straightforward interpretation of a ‘strategic move’ (or strategic change) as a 
construct. We have at least devoted some effort in the ‘result’ section to providing 
evidence about the stylized facts that occur in the strategy space. 
Control Variables  
Specific Environmental Characteristics: In accordance with several 
ecological studies (e.g., Baum and Korn, 1996; Carroll and Delacroix, 1982; 
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Carroll and Hannan, 1989a; Delacroix and Swaminathan, 1991; Delacroix et al., 
1989; Haveman, 1992; Ruef, 1997) we introduced two specific environmental 
factors which were related to the industrial environment of Spanish banks: banking 
concentration and density. Both variables are indicative of the degree of 
competitive pressure existing among these financial institutions. We also included 
the quadratic term of density as an additional control variable. Moreover, 
according to prior empirical research from the ecological view (e.g., Carroll and 
Hannan, 1989a, 1989b; Delacroix et al., 1989; Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1989; 
Hannan et al., 1995; Petersen and Koput, 1991), the estimated effects of density 
and squared density would offer an assessment of the role played by the 
legitimation and competition processes in the organizational evolution of Spanish 
banks. We used the Herfindahl concentration index, i.e. the sum of squares of 
market shares of banks, in terms of its credits, as a measure of concentration. 
Density was measured as the count of Spanish commercial banks, foreign banks 
plus savings banks for each year. 
Organizational Variables: Consistent with a great deal of theoretical and 
empirical ecological research and given the lack of conclusive findings, we 
included three organizational variables as possible determinants of Spanish banks’ 
survival: the linear and quadratic term of age, size and structural complexity. We 
include the linear and quadratic term of age in order to test the form of relationship 
between organizational age and extinction following the suggestions of prior 
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theoretical and empirical studies (e.g., Freeman et al., 1983; Hannan and Freeman, 
1984; Stinchcombe, 1965). Our interest was in verifying whether, as it is 
theoretically argued, the likelihood of organizational extinction decreases with age 
and to what extent the ‘liability of newness’ hypothesis may be corroborated in the 
population of firms under study. Following prior empirical ecological works (e.g., 
Baum and Korn, 1996; Haveman, 1992; Kelly and Amburgey, 1991; Singh et al., 
1986; Stoeberl et al., 1998), we measured organizational age as the number of 
years since founding. We used the available data on total banking assets, but as in 
other ecological studies (e.g., Haveman, 1992; Kelly and Amburgey, 1991) we 
used the natural logarithm of banking assets as an indicator of the bank size. 
Finally, we measured structural complexity in terms of number of branch offices, 
such as Hannan and Freeman (1984, p. 162) and Gresov et al., (1993, p. 197) posit.  
Firm-Specific Variables: Among these variables we suggest differentiating 
between variables associated with economic performance and management skills 
and variables linked to other types of internal factors. Traditionally, all these firm-
specific variables have been considered as potential determinants of organizational 
performance and survival. Within the economic and management skills indicators 
we include the five following variables: return on assets, labour costs per 
employee, net profit per employee, degree of employee qualification and number 
of liability accounts managed per employee. We measured return on assets as the 
ratio of net income to total assets. Labour cost per employee, net profit per 
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employee and the number of liability accounts managed per employee are usual 
measures for banking efficiency and productivity (e.g., Berger and Mester, 1997; 
DeYoung and Hasan, 1998; Grifell-Tatjé and Knox, 1996; Steinherr and 
Huveneers, 1994). We used the ratio of number of non-university graduates plus 
number of executives to the total number of employees as an indicator of degree of 
employee qualification. Finally, we also included two variables to capture the 
effect of resources related to a bank’s reputation: customer loyalty, as the ratio of 
time deposits to the total deposits, and brand loyalty, as the number of years that 
the bank has maintained its trademark divided by its age.  
Managerial Characteristics: We introduced three variables for controlling the 
effects of managerial features on organizational survival given the role delivered 
by the adaptation perspective to the chief executives: CEO succession, the 
interactive effect between CEO succession with strategic change and CEO tenure. 
In particular, the classical management theory emphasizes the moderating role that 
managers in general and CEOs in particular can play in organizational 
performance. Specifically, researchers have argued that change in the company’s 
CEO is an important mechanism for affecting organizational performance and, 
therefore, the likelihood of organizational survival. In examining this linkage, 
several researchers have found support for the ‘succession-crisis hypothesis’ that 
CEO succession is a disruptive change and, therefore, it increases the likelihood of 
organizational mortality (e.g., Carroll, 1984b; Haveman, 1993). In addition, some 
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empirical research gives support to the ‘succession-adaptation hypothesis’ when 
concluding that CEO succession improves the likelihood of organizational survival 
by reducing conflict (e.g., Singh et al., 1986; Virany et al., 1992). Furthermore, 
under the classical management perspective, managerial and strategic variables are 
not independent since low performance favours the replacement of the CEO. 
Under these alternative predictions, we state no hypotheses about the impact on 
organizational extinction of CEO succession and its interaction with the change of 
strategy. CEO succession was measured as a dummy variable which takes a value 
of 1 when a succession event occurred and 0 otherwise. CEO tenure was measured 
as the number of years a bank’s current chief executive has been at the helm.  
Identifying the Strategic Positioning of Spanish Banks: The Model-based 
Clustering 
We employed ‘Model-based Clustering’ (MCLUST) for classifying banks into 
strategic groups. This procedure has the following advantages over alternative 
clustering methods. First, this technique has a statistical basis, which allows for 
inference. It is, for example, possible to derive uncertainty estimates for individual 
classifications as well as for the clustering as a whole. Second, several criteria can 
be used to assess the optimal number of clusters, a direct consequence of the 
statistical model used to describe the data. This is a great advantage compared to 
hierarchical clustering methods, for example, where a cut-off value must be chosen 
by the user. In most cases, no clear criteria exist for such a choice. Third, the 
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clustering method can be selected according to the same criteria used for the choice 
of the number of clusters. As in the case of hierarchical clustering, several closely 
related clustering methods exist, and the one that fits the data best can be 
distinguished in an objective way. These properties of MCLUST are particularly 
useful for our research purpose. Traditional hierarchical clustering methods depend 
critically upon quite discretional parameters (e.g. the number of clusters and the 
type of distance between objects), which lack an ‘a posteriori’ statistical 
validation. In our case, we must compute a total of 15 ‘clusterings’ (one per year) 
and, therefore, the number of discretionary choices is large enough to induce 
arbitrary results in the number and composition of clusters. Alternatively, the 
MCLUST algorithm employs a single statistical criterion for both detecting the 
number of clusters and identifying the distributional properties of objects in the 
sample. The model underlying MCLUST assumes that the analyst faces a 
heterogeneous number of objects that can be accurately represented by a mixture 
of normal (Gaussian) multivariate distributions.  
Because the data are described by a statistical model rather than a heuristic 
procedure, it is possible to choose the optimal number of clusters and the ‘best’ 
clustering model. The likelihood of the classification is a first indicator, but it fails 
to incorporate the complexity of the model; more complex models will find it 
easier to fit the data well. Several measures that correct for this are available, of 
which Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC) are the most well known. The AIC (Akaike, 1974) tends to overestimate the 
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number of clusters, but it is still often used in practice. Alternatively, the BIC 
(Schwarz, 1978) will select models with fewer parameters, hence more 
parsimonious models (at least for cases where n>8). In the MCLUST software 
used in this study the BIC value allowed us to choose the optimal model and 
number of clusters. It should be noted that the ‘optimal model’ and ‘optimal 
number of clusters’ are used here in the sense of ‘best describing the data’; whether 
this is also optimal in terms of interpretation of the clustering should be assessed 
afterwards. Calculations in this research were performed by the MCLUST package 
for model-based clustering by Fraley and Raftery (1998b)6.  
Defining and Measuring the Effect of Strategic Change on Organizational 
Survival 
The binary nature of our dependent variable (‘strategic move’ or strategic 
change) precludes the use of a linear regression model as an empirical tool because 
of the violation of some critical assumptions (Greene, 1993, p. 871). Instead, the 
discrete choice models are a better statistical representation of a binary response 
variable. Actually, panel data techniques can minimize risk of inconsistent 
estimators resulting from cross-sectional estimation when individual effects exist. 
This fact is likely to occur in our research object (organizational survival) given the 
number of potential idiosyncratic factors that could substantially affect the survival 
chances of the bank (property and governance structure, technology, organizational 
design, among others).  
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The most common options for characterizing a binary response model are the 
‘logit’ and ‘probit’ specifications, which differ in the alternative assumption about 
the underlying distribution of the dependent variable (logistic in the logit model 
and Gaussian in the probit model). Similarly to the linear case, binary choice 
models for panel data may lead to different models depending on the nature -
random or deterministic- assumed for the firm-specific effects.  
From a purely methodological perspective, we cannot advocate an absolute 
advantage of one of the above specifications over the other (logit vs. probit, fixed 
vs. random). These models differ in terms of technical assumptions and properties. 
Fixed effects models provide consistent (asymptotically unbiased) estimators even 
though the individual effects are actually random, whilst the random effects 
specification leads to more efficient estimates but fails to be consistent when 
individual effects are correlated to the independent variables. Comparative 
validation between both specifications is available by means of the Hausman test.  
In practice, there are some methodological peculiarities of binary response 
models for panel data that favour random effects estimation owing to the 
characteristics of our data. The estimation procedure of a fixed-effects model 
excludes all observations with ‘ones’ or ‘zeros’ for every year. In our case, this 
implies first, that the sample size of the fixed effects models decreases drastically 
and second, that the Hausman (fixed vs. random effects) test does not apply, given 
the disparity of sample sizes. In addition, the treatment of random effects in the 
logit model becomes more complicated than in the probit specification. Since the 
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random effects are assumed to be Gaussian, the likelihood function of a logit 
model incorporates the mix of Gaussian (random effects) and logistic (response 
variable) distributions. The resulting likelihood function cannot be computed in 
exact terms but only approximately (usually by means of the Gauss-Hermitian 
method). Conversely, the probit model with random effects provides a more easily 
computable likelihood function and therefore more accurate estimates (Greene, 
1993, p. 897). 
We finally chose the probit model with random-effects for presenting our 
results on the basis of its relative advantages (i.e. more degrees of freedom and the 
higher accuracy of the estimation procedure). In any case, there is always an 
unmeasurable risk of a potential misspecification since the ‘true’ underlying 
distribution is unknown and cannot be tested. At most, we can only minimize this 
hazard by assessing potential discrepancies between logit and probit estimates that 
could lead us to contradictory findings. Fortunately, we corroborated that both 
specifications, logit and probit, provide highly consistent results with no major 
differences in the signs and significance levels of the estimated effects. 
Unfortunately, we cannot provide even such indirect confirmatory evidence for 
assessing the accuracy of the random vs. fixed effects hypothesis given the small 
size of the relevant sample when fixed effects models are estimated. 
A general specification of probit model with random effects can be expressed 
as follows: 
Yit* = β’Xit + Uit , where Yit = 1 if Yit* > 0 and Yit = 0 otherwise,  
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where Yit is observable but not Yit*. β represents the vector of coefficients to 
be estimated. The random perturbation, Uit, is assumed to be εit* + εi, where εit* 
and εi, are normally distributed random perturbations. 
RESULTS 
Findings on the strategic mobility of Spanish banks 
We did not find any SSTP over the 15-year period under analysis; thus, we ran 
the MCLUST procedure for grouping banks in each of the 15 years. Table 3 
summarizes some basic information about the strategic groups identified in each 
year and their evolution through the period analysed.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
The number of SGs appears to increase roughly until 1990 (11 SGs) and 
decrease moderately from 1995 until the end of the period. The proportion of 
banks subject to moves from one SG to another offers a more erratic trend with 
minima around 29% (year 1997) and two noticeable maxima in 1985 (90%) and 
1991 (77%). Actually, the cumulative proportion of banks subject to changes in 
their SG throughout the complete period is about 90%. This last figure suggests 
that almost all banks included in our study were engaged in some strategic move 
event between 1983 and 19977. Although this finding appears to support the 
pattern of strategic behaviour predicted from the adaptation view, this 
interpretation could be misleading. As we advanced in the methodological section, 
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the aggregated assessment of strategic mobility could be eventually overestimated 
because of (a) the characteristics of our empirical setting, which includes the total 
population of the industry; and (b) our definition of the strategy space. Therefore, 
these findings should be cautiously interpreted when they are compared with other 
empirical evidence as an assessment of the aggregated strategic mobility. 
Table 4 can provide additional insights on this issue. The total number of SGs 
identified throughout the whole fifteen-year period is 26. Among these groups, 
only 12 groups, which are considered in our study as the most stable ones, 
persisted more than five years. Given their short existence, the remaining 13 SGs 
seem to be more transition points or temporary structures rather than long term 
patterns of strategic behaviour (eleven groups disappeared after two years, one 
group after one year, another one after four years and last one after five years of 
existence). Actually, these transitory or short-lived SGs can be interpreted as 
temporary strategic patterns that banks follow when moving between more stable 
strategic groups. Furthermore, banks following this path are more likely to survive 
over time when they definitely move to a more stable group. From this standpoint, 
these results offer some support for the logic that incremental strategic change is 
less hazardous than radical changes in strategy. 
Clearly, the aggregate mobility of SGs would decrease substantially under the 
assumption that only long-lived SGs can properly represent the strategic behaviour 
of organizations. Thus the proliferation of SGs is conditioned by our 
methodological assumptions and only provides a weak support for the adaptation 
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approach when advocating that strategic change is not a rare and hazardous event. 
Yet, it is noticeable that both the strategic diversity (measured by the number of 
SGs) and the strategic mobility (i.e. the average displacement of SGs) roughly 
increased throughout the fifteen-year period: ‘early’ and stable SGs (I, II, III, and 
IV) appear to be less dynamic, measured by the average displacement of centroids, 
than ‘later’ and short-lived SGs (XXI, XXII and XXV) but, on the other hand, the 
highest mortality rate was verified in the middle of the period (12 out of 39 bank 
extinctions took place in 1993). To sum up, the strategic diversity increased at the 
end of the period but only after a substantial reduction in population size (95 banks 
in 1985, and 88 in 1997). Hence this preliminary evidence sheds little light to 
assess the impact of strategic mobility on organizational survival.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Findings on the effect of strategic change on the likelihood of 
organizational extinction 
Table 5 summarizes descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables used 
in this study and Table 6 presents the results from random-effects models estimates 
in order to assess the robustness of the estimated effect of strategic moves (or 
strategic change) on the probability of organizational extinction. The five models 
include as control variables two subsets of explanatory variables: (1) profitability 
(return on assets) and size and (2) other variables suggested by different theoretical 
views cited above as potential determinants of organizational extinction. 
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Insert Table 5 about here 
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
Model M1 is basically grounded in the ecological approach which poses that 
environmental conditions and structural inertia are major determinants of 
organizational failure. Thus, specific proxies for this model are concentration, the 
linear and quadratic terms of density, the linear and quadratic terms of 
organizational age, the total number of branch offices, size and return on assets. 
Model M2 explores potential effects of human resources related factors such as 
efficiency, qualification and costs of the work force and it includes as explanatory 
variables the labour costs per employee, net profit per employee, degree of 
employee qualification, and the number of liability accounts managed per 
employee. This model is clearly based on the adaptive approach of firm behaviour 
as is model M3, which considers managerial features (CEO succession, the 
interactive effect of CEO succession with strategic change and CEO tenure) as 
possible determinants of organizational failure. Also rooted in the adaptation 
perspective, model M4 states potential firm-idiosyncratic explanations of 
organizational extinction which are directly related to the banks’ ability to design 
and implement stable and long-run strategies. Number of years with no changes in 
a bank’s brand (brand loyalty) may reflect, to some extent, the relevance of long 
term relationships in consolidating absolute advantages of reputation resources 
based on the mutual loyalty between the bank and its clients. The ratio of time 
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deposits over total deposits can also be considered as a revealing indicator of 
banks’ orientation to adapt the availability of funds to the needs that arise from 
long term planning, and not only an indicator of the degree of confidence of 
customers toward a bank (customer loyalty). Finally, the last column of Table 6 
offers the estimates of a comprehensive specification (model M5) integrating the 
variables of models with the highest explanatory power (models M1, M2 and M3). 
Notwithstanding the model considered, the effect of strategic moves (or 
strategic change) remains unequivocally negative and significant, at least at a 95% 
confidence level. The robustness and statistical significance of the effect of 
strategic mobility strongly supports the positive impact of adaptive behaviour on 
the survival chances for Spanish banks. This finding backs Hypothesis 1, which 
states that strategic repositioning is a good practice even when the environmental 
conditions become unstable and volatile as they have been for banks in the period 
under study.  
Much less robust are the estimated effects of control variables. Although there 
are no drastic changes in the sign of the estimates, we find some variation in their 
magnitude and significance among the proposed models. Regarding the common 
controls (return on assets and size), only profitability (return on assets) exhibited 
negative and significant estimates in almost every model (except models M2 and 
M5). These results are partially attributable to the endogenous nature of 
profitability with respect to other explanatory variables such as size, labour costs 
per employee and the degree of employee qualification8. Nevertheless, the function 
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of these control variables are to mainly minimize the bias by omitting relevant 
explanatory information and, therefore, no substantial gains are made by stating 
accurate specifications for control variables’ interactions as they are peripheral to 
our research purpose. In any case, the comparative analysis of every estimated 
model may also serve as a comparative test of alternative explanations to 
organizational extinction by assessing the relative explanatory power of the 
corresponding control variables. In this vein, our findings provide mixed 
interpretations. The ecological-inertial approach underlying model M1 exhibits 
higher goodness of fit (see Wald test) than other adaptation-based models (models 
M2, M3 and M4). This fact favours the ecological-inertial approach as the best 
predictive theory of organizational extinction for the Spanish banks. In this view, 
the likelihood of bank survival is enhanced by the strategic repositioning and 
profitability. Conversely, number of branch offices, concentration and density 
would increase the probability of bank extinction. The negative and significant 
effect of the quadratic term of density suggests that the extinction rate is an 
inverted-U-shaped function of organizational density, according to predictions 
from the legitimation and competition model of organizational evolution. The 
linear and squared terms of age do not achieve statistical significance, mainly 
owing to the noticeable correlation (more than 0.9) between both terms (see Table 
5). Thus, we do not find evidence for the ‘liability of newness’ hypothesis in our 
population. Other potential caveats due to approximate collinearity among 
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explanatory variables (size, concentration, and number of branch offices) have 
little impact as they become significant at the usual levels of confidence.  
A noteworthy outcome is that the number of bank branches shows a positive 
and larger effect than the logarithm of assets. A number of empirical studies have 
used both variables as indicators of size but, in the light of our evidence the 
number of branch offices, as a proxy, adds non-redundant information on 
organizational extinction which is not completely captured by the amount of assets. 
This evidence validates the assumption of Gresov et al., (1993, p. 197) when 
stating that the number of branch offices may approximate the structural 
complexity in addition to bank size. 
We examined the role of economic factors such as efficiency, productivity and 
management capabilities in organizational survival through the model M2. 
Although the model performance in terms of the Wald test is still far from the 
ecological-inertial model (M1) we corroborated that the high explanatory power is 
mostly attributable to the labour cost per employee9. Without abandoning the 
adaptation perspective, model M3 explores other idiosyncratic features of banks 
such as those coupled with CEO succession, CEO tenure and the interaction 
between CEO succession and strategic change. Although the two former variables 
fail to be individually significant at the usual confidence levels, the interaction 
term exhibits a positive and highly significant effect on the likelihood of 
organizational extinction. This finding suggests that banks which have undergone 
changes in their competitive strategies accompanied by CEO succession will be 
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more prone to extinction than banks which have undergone strategic changes 
without CEO succession. This means that although strategic change increases the 
likelihood of organizational survival, when it is accompanied by CEO succession 
this effect is reversed. As expected, this finding would entail that strategic change 
reduces the likelihood of organizational mortality when it is carried out by the 
current CEO of the company. Actually, excluding this interaction term in model 
M3 entails a substantial loss in the Wald test which changes from 18.85 (with a p-
value of 0.004) to 10.48 (with a p-value of 0.06). Simultaneously, the individual 
effect of strategic change reveals a larger negative impact on the likelihood of 
organizational extinction than models without the aforementioned interaction.    
We find the lowest Wald test value in model M4, which attempts to capture 
other firm-specific factors such as those related to the bank’s ability to implement 
long term policies (customer and brand loyalty). This poor goodness of fit reveals 
that organizational survival, at least for the Spanish banks, is not affected by 
reputation resources. The deregulation process and the availability of new markets 
and competition modes can explain this fact. Lending and borrowing rates were 
rarely considered by banks as variables for competition in narrow and highly 
constrained financial markets. Prior to liberalization, mainly reputation and 
customized services were the cornerstones of the banking business in order to 
enlarge and maintain an increasing base of loyal customers. The extended arena for 
competition resulting from the deregulation process led to changes in the attributes 
of banking services that customers used to value and this gave rise to a more 
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competitive behaviour in terms of financial rates and fares. Obviously, measuring 
errors and/or the inability of the proposed variables for measuring reputation or 
commercial intangible resources can also explain the poor performance of model 
M4 in terms of goodness of fit. Finally model M5 includes as explanatory variables 
those with the highest explanatory power, which basically correspond to models 
M1, M2 and M3. Clearly, this model exhibits the best goodness of fit with a value 
of 38.43 for the Wald test. Again, the frequency of ‘strategic moves’ (or strategic 
change) remains as a significant and negative determinant of the likelihood of bank 
extinction. Regarding the control variables, this comprehensive model confirms the 
relevance of the number of branch offices and labour costs per employee in bank 
disappearance but the quadratic term of density and the interaction between CEO 
succession and strategic change are mostly responsible for the large gain in the 
Wald test of model M5 over the previous models. 
Findings on the relationship between strategic behaviour of Spanish banks 
and organizational extinction 
In view of the fact that in our study mobility through different strategic groups 
(strategic change) increased the likelihood of organizational survival, the next step 
led us to examine which kinds of strategies have to a great extent saved Spanish 
banks from extinction over the period under analysis and whether there has been a 
particular match between strategy and new environmental conditions over time. To 
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answer these two basic issues we use the information from Table 3 and Table 7, 
respectively.  
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
Table 7 shows the mean number of banks per year, the mean percentage of 
bank extinctions and the competitive pattern of the most stable groups identified 
between 1983 and 199710. The most stable groups represented about 80 per cent of 
the total banks in the sample. Our findings suggest that there were five stable 
groups with the highest mean percentage of bank extinctions (groups II, IX, XVIII, 
XXI and XXV). The main strategic characteristics of banks belonging to these 
groups are summarized in the last column of this Table on the basis of the 
importance of each of the seven variables used in this study and another two 
supplementary variables (number of branch offices and type of customers). These 
characteristics are the following: Firstly, if we consider the classification of 
competitive strategy proposed by ecologists (that is, the distinction between 
specialist versus generalist strategies), we can point out that the banks of three of 
the five groups followed more generalist competitive strategies –commercial 
and/or universal banking in the lending market with a very broad customer base 
composed of households, and small, medium and large businesses. Secondly, 
although there were some exceptions (banks of groups IX and XXI), in general, 
they were much less innovative than the banks belonging to groups with a higher 
probability of surviving. Thirdly, it can be seen that the banks of three groups 
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which have followed more generalist strategies (groups II, IX and XVIII) had a 
weak creditor or balanced position in the inter-bank market and the banks with 
more specialized strategies (groups XXI and XXV) had a very strong debtor 
position in this particular market. Finally, banks in all these groups had a high or 
very high number of branch offices. On the contrary, the banks of the five groups 
with the lowest mean percentage of bank extinctions (groups VIII, X, XVI, XXII 
and XXIII) showed the following strategic characteristics (see Table 7): Firstly, 
banks belonging to four of these five groups followed a more specialized strategy 
(institutional banking or commercial banking in the lending market usually with a 
narrower customer base, e.g. large businesses) and they were basically composed 
of small banks, while the banks of group XXIII followed a more generalized 
strategy (Commercial and institutional banking) and was primarily composed of 
the largest banks of the population. Secondly, the banks of all these groups were 
highly or very highly innovative. Thirdly, in comparison to the banks of the groups 
with the highest probability of organizational extinction, we can see that the banks 
that followed more specialized strategies (groups X, XVI and XXII) had the 
strongest creditor position in the inter-bank market while the banks that followed a 
more generalized strategy (group XXIII) exhibited a strong debtor position in this 
kind of market. Finally, banks belonging to four of these five groups had a very 
low number of branch offices. Moreover, we have observed that although the mean 
number of banks per year was low in most of the groups, the number of new 
entrants increased over time. It would be very interesting to explore in future 
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research whether nowadays the level of stability of all these groups is maintained. 
In this context, we have also corroborated that banks have adopted more and more 
specialized and innovative competitive strategies over time. Specifically, we 
distinguished three periods in the evolution of the strategic behaviour of the 
population of firms analyzed (see Tables 3 and 7). The first period ranged from 
1983 to 1987 (the year after Spain joined the EC) and it can be characterized, in 
general, as a period of low strategic diversity. The Spanish banking industry was 
still highly regulated at that moment despite the important environmental shifts 
which were beginning to take place. Banks were still limited in their ability to 
adopt new competitive patterns and introduce highly innovative financial products 
and services. On the contrary, the second period, between the years 1988 and 1992, 
can be characterized as a period of very high strategic diversity and instability. 
During this period, fundamental changes occurred in the environmental conditions; 
changes essentially associated with the banking and financial deregulation process 
(see Table 1). Banks started to adopt more innovative competitive strategies and 
specialize in particular market segments as a means of facing up to the strong 
competition from other financial institutions (mainly savings banks and foreign 
banks). Despite important environmental changes that also occurred in the third 
period (from 1992 to 1997), strategic diversity significantly decreased but banks 
were continuously interested in introducing new financial products and services for 
their different market segments as a direct result of the increasing rivalry. Banks 
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with more conservative strategies were almost non-existent at the end of this 
period.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Our insight into the effects of strategic changes on organizational chances for 
survival is designed as a test of competing hypotheses derived from quite different 
theoretical backgrounds. This methodological approach has some remarkable 
advantages over empirical efforts based on testing a single theory or perspective 
since it is not only able to look into the absolute validity of a conceptual scheme 
but it also serves as a measurement of their relative validity as opposed to other 
alternative explanations of the available evidence. In this vein, we explored the 
effect of the strategic mobility (or strategic change) of Spanish banks on their 
probability of organizational extinction, along with the potential impact of other 
potential determinants proposed by theory and previous empirical research.  
Our findings suggest that banks are able to change their competitive strategies 
in order to maximize their chances of survival. In general, this result clearly 
favours the adaptation perspective versus the ecological perspective, which 
frequently tends to view strategic change as a hazardous event. Consequently, our 
findings are in line with the longitudinal empirical research of Amburgey et al., 
(1993), Haveman (1992), Singh et al., (1986), Smith and Grimm (1987) and Zajac 
et al., (2000). Another conclusion of this research is that we have observed that 
banks with the highest probability of surviving are those which have decided to 
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focus on those activities where they find a solid competitive position and are 
continuously interested in innovating or offering new financial products and 
services for their particular market segments. Our analysis also suggests that the 
density-dependence processes of legitimation and competition can also play an 
important role in explaining organizational extinction. Also, we find that some 
other organizational characteristics (number of branch offices), strategic change 
when it is accompanied by CEO succession and certain efficiency indicators of 
banks (profitability and labour costs per employee) are meaningful forces in their 
proclivity to extinction. 
From a methodological point of view, this work proposes two major 
contributions. We have benefited from the great potential of the MCLUST 
grouping algorithm used to determine the strategic groups as a previous step for 
defining the strategic move (or strategic change) of firms. The basics of this 
grouping method allow a more objective procedure to determine critical outcomes 
from cluster analysis, i.e. the number of the resulting groups. Moreover, this loss of 
discretionary control over the methodology does not weaken the robustness of our 
findings. Actually, the estimated effect of our variable of interest, –the strategic 
move–, is statistically significant and with few changes in all model specifications. 
Regarding the regression analysis, we also suggest panel data formulations in order 
to control effectively unobservable firm-specific effects likely to distort estimates 
when they are not controlled as occurs when using cross-sectional models of 
‘probit’ regression.  
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Finally, we point out some limitations and future extensions of this work. First, 
we recognise that the results of our study need to be interpreted in the light of the 
major institutional and structural features of the Spanish banking system. As in 
other bank-based financial systems, the leading Spanish banks control huge 
industrial portfolios and the public sector has played a fundamental role in the 
building process of the financial system in general and the banking sector in 
particular. Furthermore, compared with the banking systems of other industrialised 
countries, the Spanish banking system at early stages of the period under study 
appeared, in general, oversized, sound, less open in terms of trade in banking 
services, overpriced, not very efficient and productive, with a small development 
level with respect to GNP but a very important weight in the financial system, a 
very extensive branch network, a highly concentrated ownership structure and a 
relatively high degree of market power (Caminal et al., 1993; Crespí, García-
Cestona and Salas, 2004; Pastor, Pérez and Quesada, 1997). These peculiarities 
mean that some caution should be taken concerning the extrapolation of our 
findings to alternative empirical settings. On the other hand, the profitability and 
concentration levels of banks in Spain, the characteristics of the human and 
physical capital employed in the industry, the rate of technical progress in both the 
product and the process levels, the deregulation and liberalization process and the 
increasing concentration of the banking industry do not seem to be very different 
from the European norm. Therefore, it would be interesting to carry out empirical 
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studies on the same theme in other countries in order to assess to what extent our 
results may be affected by the institutional and structural differences considered. 
Second, we are aware that our results can be sensitive to the variables selected 
for defining and identifying a strategic move (or strategic change) event as well as 
the method used for measuring this construct. In this vein, it would be interesting 
to find out if the positive link between strategic change and survival remains robust 
when choosing less ‘flexible’ dimensions of firms’ strategic behaviour, such as 
some ‘core characteristics’ of the organizational design. Third, assuming that the 
costs and risks of strategic change may differ substantially across industries, our 
results should be extrapolated with caution to other populations until new and more 
extensive empirical studies are available. The banking sector may be subject to 
higher competitive pressures than others with a more limited ability of firms to 
imitate competitors’ products or services such as, for example, the pharmaceutical 
or biotechnology industries. It is also clear that the choice of a time period with 
highly unstable environmental conditions enhances our expectation of finding 
higher mobility among strategic groups. A more comprehensive model of strategic 
change could include environmental factors (e.g. complexity and volatility) as 
additional parameters to explain organizational survival. This would help to 
clarify, from a dynamic perspective, the role of potential feedback effects between 
the level of strategic mobility and the stability of environmental conditions. 
 Finally, our characterization of ‘strategic move’ as a construct can be useful to 
identify and discriminate meaningful strategic drifts for a given individual 
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(banking firm) but it provides limited information useful for characterizing or 
quantifying the strategic change. To overcome this limitation, we should consider 
additional qualifying criteria able to offer a more detailed description of the nature 
or type of each strategic move, for instance, as a function of the features of both 
SGs involved in an individual strategic move (SG of ‘origin’ and SG of ‘arrival’). 
Longevity, stability, size, or intra-group homogeneity of SGs may pose distinctive 
patterns of change and survival. These extensions would contribute to enriching 
the analysis by exploring how and why strategic change affects the likelihood of 
organizational survival in a more fine-grained manner, and eventually, they might 
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1 However, in line with Boeker (1989, p. 490), it is also interesting to outline that 
strategy, from the adaptation perspective, can sometimes be characterized as 
relatively inertial and, therefore, organizations can be constrained in their ability to 
adapt their competitive strategies to new environmental conditions. This occurs 
under the following three conditions: (a) when organizations exhibit ‘strategic 
momentum’ (see Amburgey et al., 1993; Kelly and Amburgey, 1991; Miller and 
Friesen, 1984; Quinn, 1980); (b) when there are high ‘mobility barriers’ within an 
industry (see Porter, 1980, Hatten and Hatten, 1987) and; (c) when the access to 
‘strategic factor markets’ is precluded or very costly and therefore firms need to 
accumulate those strategic resources internally by means of large and/or long term 
investments (see Barney, 1986; Teece et al., 1997). 
2 The other core features are: (1) its stated goals; (2) forms of authority; and (3) 
core technology. Hannan and Freeman (1984, p. 156) consider strategy as the 
fourth core characteristic. In their opinion, these four characteristics stand in a 
rough hierarchy, with stated goals usually subject to the strongest constraints and 
strategy the weakest. Thus, they argue that the likelihood of change declines as one 
proceeds up the hierarchy (1984, p. 156). Specifically, strategy research indicates 
that, while strategic inertia constrains organizations, it may also initiate substantial 
change in response to continuous and radical environmental shifts (Baum, 1996; 
Baum and Amburgey, 2002, p. 310). We recognize, as Baum and Amburgey 
(2002, p. 310) do, that strategic inertia cannot be necessarily harmful since it can 
sometimes keep organizations from responding too quickly and frequently to 
uncertain environmental change. In this context, as these authors state, 
“Ultimately, whether [strategic] inertia [is] adaptive depends on the hazardousness 
of change”. Taking into account all these ideas, in a prior empirical study Haveman 
(1992) supported that when environmental conditions undergo a sudden 
transformation, change in competitive strategies can prove beneficial to short-run 
performance and to long-run survival chances. 
3 We employed the following criteria for selecting these yearly observations: the 
number of employees, staff expenditures and number of branch offices in each 
bank had to be greater than zero for each year. 
4 Probably one of the most challenging issues in the literature about organizational 
survival is associated with the way of defining and considering the mergers and 
takeovers. See Carroll and Delacroix (1982, p. 170) and Wheelock and Wilson 
(2000) for a deep discussion on this subject. 
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5 See, for example, Carroll (1984b), Haveman (1993), Kesner and Sebora (1994) or 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) for a comprehensive review of this topic.  
6 The original program (http://www.stat.washington.edu/fraley/mclust/soft.html) is 
an add-on package for S-plus (http://www.insightful.com). A more complete 
account of currently available software for mixture modelling is given in 
McLachlan and Peel (2000). Additional information on MCLUST details and 
application can be found in Campbell et al., (1997), Celeux and Govaert (1995), 
Dasgupta and Raftery (1998) or Yeung et al., (2001). 
7 Although we found no SSTPs larger than one year and there is a high level of 
cumulative strategic moves over the 15-year period, a detailed examination of the 
follow-up of each bank from 1983 to 1997 shows that the  SGs as a whole 
experienced a quite steady evolution rather than an annual free-for-all 
transformation. Additional evidence can be obtained from the authors upon 
request. 
8 This fact cannot be directly inferred from the correlation matrix (see Table5). 
However, auxiliary panel estimates (not displayed in the paper) showed significant 
coefficients of degree of employee qualification (positive), labour costs per 
employee (negative), and size (negative) over return on assets. 
9 Estimates not presented in the paper offer strong support for this explanation. The 
value of the Wald test was 17.67 (with p-value of .0014) when excluding ‘net 
profit per employee’, ‘employee qualification’ and ‘accounts per employee’ in 
model M2, but it dropped to 10.72 (with p-value of .09) if ‘labour cost per 
employee’ was omitted. 
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FUNDAMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES IN THE SPANISH BANKING 
SYSTEM FROM 1983 TO 1997 
YEARS MAIN ENVIRONMENTAL EVENTS  
1983-1984 A severe crisis experienced by the Spanish banking industry that started in 1978 comes to an end.  
1985 Freedom of branching is complete except for foreign banks and for the geographical limits imposed on savings banks, 
which would be removed later. The Spanish government takes several measures in economic policy, such as a 
restrictive monetary policy, which continues until the late 1980s and early 1990s 
1986 Spain joins the European Community (EC). From this moment, the Spanish government is obliged to adapt the Spanish 
banking legislation to European banking rules. In this context, it establishes a gradual adjustment schedule for the 
period 1986-92 to deregulate the number of branch offices that an EC bank can open and the composition of its 
liabilities 
1987 All interest rates and service charges are liberalized 
1988 The Spanish savings banks are allowed to expand their number of branch offices outside their own geographic region. 
This possibility of expansion induces a process of mergers and takeovers between savings banks which increases 
concentration in the sector and competitiveness in the Spanish banking system. Spanish banks and savings banks are 
also required to keep 18 per cent of a subset of their liabilities as deposits in the Bank of Spain. An 11.5 per cent share 
of these deposits receives a rate return of 7.75 per cent. The level of the coefficient as well as its return is changed quite 
frequently by the Bank of Spain. The Spanish government instigates a major reform of the stock market, reflected in the 
1988 Reform Bill. As a direct result of this reform banking starts to play an essential role in the stock market 
1989 The Spanish credit cooperatives and Spanish banks and savings banks start to compete under similar conditions. In 
January, the Spanish government commits itself to a gradual phasing out of the investment coefficients, and they 
disappear completely by January 1993. The Spanish currency (peseta) enters into the exchange mechanism of the EMS. 
An open price war breaks out between the major firms in the Spanish banking system. The period 1989-92 also 
witnesses several important mergers among the major Spanish banks, as well as some minor operations involving a 
large number of small savings banks. In addition, important changes in the behaviour of the clientele start to occur 
1990 The Spanish government introduces legal changes that allow banks to drastically lower their reserve coefficient 
1991 The complete liberalization of capital flows across EC countries occurs this year. As a consequence of the public bank 
reorganization a public conglomerate of a very significant size appears. The impact of this public bank reorganization in 
the loan market is considerable 
1992 The Treaty of the European Union (EU) comes into effect. This Treaty represents an important impetus towards the 
definitive putting into circulation of the European Currency Unit in January 2002 
1993 This year the European Single Market comes into effect. From 1993, Spanish authorities have to authorize any bank, 
Spanish or EU, as long as the candidate satisfies the given legal conditions, and their discretionary power is abolished. 
This event implies an important increase in the degree of competitive rivalry in this industry 
1994 Spanish legislation regarding credit entities is adapted to the Second Community Directive of Bank Coordination, 
which fits Spanish legislation to the Community conception of right of establishment 
1995 A new legal regime for the creation of banks is passed. This unleashes a real battle within the sector to massively 
incorporate the new information technologies to all kinds of financial products and services. This technological 
revolution entails a continuation of the one started in the 1960s and the 1970s, which was intensified during the 1980s 
1996 The economic crisis period that began in 1992 finishes. A significant number of financial entities disappear during this 
time interval (1993-1996) 
1997 A strong economic growth in the Spanish economy starts to occur 
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STRATEGIC VARIABLES: DEFINITION, MARKET SEGMENT AND BUSINESS STRATEGY 
 Strategic variables Definition 
Market Segment 
(Business Banking Strategy) 
ASSET V1 Commercial Loans / Financial Investments Lending Market               
(Commercial Banking) 
 V2 Portfolio of Securities / Financial Investments Lending Market             
(Investment Banking) 
 V3 Treasury / Financial Investments Lending Market               
(Institutional Banking) 
LIABILITY V4 Savings and Deposits Accounts / Borrowed Capital Instrument Saving Market  
(Traditional Banking) 
 V5 Current Accounts / Borrowed Capital Instrument Saving Market  
(Innovative Banking) 




V7 Net Position in Financial Markets / Total Liabilities Inter-bank Market 
(Creditor-Debtor Position) 
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TABLE 3  




                
 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Number of SGs 5 6 7 5 5 8 8 11 7 10 9 10 9 8 6 
                
Number of new SGs 0 2 5 0 0 3 2 3 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 
Number of SGs disappeared 0 1 4 2 0 0 2 0 5 0 2 0 1 1 2 
Net change in number of SGs 0 1 1 -2 0 3 0 3 -4 3 -1 1 -1 -1 -2 
Number of SGs that persist 0 4 2 5 5 5 6 8 6 7 8 9 9 8 6 
Percentage of firms 
undergoing strategic change 
0 0.41 0.90 0.62 0.31 0.44 0.55 0.51 0.77 0.55 0.45 0.41 0.32 0.4 0.29 
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STRATEGIC GROUPS (SGs) AND AVERAGE DISPLACEMENT OF CENTROIDS 
 



































Chronogram of SGs with more than one year of existence. Figures beside the bars are computed  
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX (N= 1257 observations) 
Variables                    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Mean                  0.029 0.504 0.074 208.9 43647.3 60.50 6108.8 175.3 11.56 0.010 5.228 14.77 0.494 127.01 0.159 0.078 4.865 0.338 0.559
Standard Deviation 0.169 0.500 0.012 5.048              
                    
2098.9 49.50 10158.4 414.7 1.645 0.034 2.774 127.9 0.138 200.4 0.366 0.268 5.153 0.228 0.405
  1. Organizational extinction
  2. Strategic change                    
                   
                  
                
                
               
                    
                    
               
                 
            
-0.062
  3. Concentration 0.052 -0.085
  4. Density -0.016 0.113 -0.709
  5. Density2 -0.017 0.112 -0.708 0.999
  6. Age -0.010 -0.037 -0.068 0.062 0.062
  7. Age2 -0.022 -0.048 -0.010 0.008 0.008 0.902
  8. Number of branch offices 0.071 -0.136 -0.003 0.002 0.002 0.019 0.022             
  9. Size 0.012 -0.161 0.074 -0.076 -0.076 0.070 0.013 0.665
10. Return on assets -0.076 -0.008 -0.011 0.052 0.054 0.022 0.009 -0.010 -0.020           
11. Labour costs per employee 0.134 -0.044 0.562 -0.435 -0.433 -0.117 -0.086 -0.063 -0.007 -0.053          
12. Net profit per employee -0.017 -0.028 0.067 -0.067 -0.066 -0.034 -0.031 -0.041 -0.061 0.604 0.074         
13. Degree of employee qualification 0.040 -0.040 0.358 -0.269 -0.267 -0.058 -0.068 -0.073 -0.002 0.057 0.486 0.103        
14. CEO succession 0.040 -0.012 -0.029 0.015 0.015 -0.001 -0.014 -0.039 -0.081 -0.094 0.052 -0.041 0.015
15. CEO succession x strategic change 0.072 0.289 -0.044 0.063 0.063 -0.036 -0.048 -0.056 -0.102 -0.077 0.063 -0.031 0.003 0.669
16. CEO tenure -0.013 -0.028 0.055 -0.024 -0.024 0.221 0.189 0.095 0.239 0.058 -0.061 0.003 -0.110 -0.405 -0.275     
17. Customer loyalty 0.039 -0.131 -0.102 -0.029 -0.031 0.197 0.192 0.118 0.069 -0.078 -0.217 -0.133 -0.222 0.023 -0.035 0.090    
18. Brand loyalty 0.017 -0.078 0.016 -0.039 -0.040 -0.434 -0.317 0.267 0.210 0.051 -0.055 0.056 -0.128 -0.077 -0.064 0.114 0.006
19. Liability accounts per employee -0.010 -0.071 0.117 -0.140 -0.140 0.070 0.082 0.038 0.043 -0.012 0.075 0.026 0.139 -0.040 -0.067 0.043 0.235 -0.066
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ESTIMATES OF PROBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS 
Independent and control variables      M1       M2      M3       M4        M5 
      










  Strategic change  -0.3656**  
(0.1600)  
-0.3184**  
(0.1547)   
 -0.6104*** 
 (0.1922)  
-0.2816**  
(0.1515)    
-0.7024*** 
(0.2092) 
  Concentration  25.4973**  
(12.0854)     
                                   19.3210 
(13.0305) 
  Density 5.5977** 
(2.5347)       
                                   6.0422** 
(2.6157) 
  Density2 -0.0133** 
(0.0060) 
   -0.0143** 
(0.0062) 
  Age 0.0102 
(0.0060)    
                                   0.0102 
(0.0061) 
  Age2  -0.00006     
(0.00004) 
                                   -0.00006 
(0.0002) 
  Number of branch offices 0.0005*** 
(0.0002) 
                                   0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
  Labour costs per employee               0.0591*** 
(0.0220) 
                       0.0598** 
(0.0255) 
  Net profit per employee               -0.0003 
(0.0019)    
                        
  Degree of employee qualification                -0.0003 
(0.0005)    
                        
  Liability accounts per employee               0.0213 
(0.6222)     
                        
  CEO succession                           -0.3496 
(0.3188)   
            -0.3817 
(0.3260) 




  CEO tenure                            0.0012 
(0.0162)   
             
  Customer loyalty                                       0.3268  
(0.3208) 
 
  Brand loyalty                                       0.1036 
(0.1881) 
 
  Size (log. of bank assets)  -0.1091    
 (0.0628) 
 0.0176    
 (0.0437) 
0.0107 
(0.0449)   
0.0030 
(0.0437)    
-0.1093 
(0.0645) 
  Return on assets   -2.5895*  
 (1.6958)  
-2.0390    
(2.1300) 






  Number of observations  1257           1257         1257      1257         1257 
  Number of banks   134            134          134       134          134 









* p-value<0.1; ** p-value<0.05; *** p-value<0.01 
 a Wald test: Significance of the whole model; b degrees of freedom 
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STABLE SGs WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST PERCENTAGE OF BANK 
EXTINCTIONS 






Lending Market:  COMMERCIAL and UNIVERSAL BANKING (High proportion of V1, V2 and V3) 
Instrument Saving Market:  TRADITIONAL BANKING (High proportion of V4) 
Inter-Bank Market:  WEAK CREDITOR POSITION 






Lending Market:  UNIVERSAL BANKING (High proportion of V2, V1 and V3) 
Instrument Saving Market:  INNOVATIVE BANKING (High proportion of V6) 
Inter-Bank Market:  WEAK CREDITOR POSITION 






Lending Market:  COMMERCIAL and UNIVERSAL BANKING (High proportion of V1, V2 and V3) 
Instrument Saving Market:  INNOVATIVE and TRADITIONAL BANKING (High proportion of V6,V5 and V4) 
Inter-Bank Market:  BALANCED POSITION 






Lending Market:  COMMERCIAL BANKING (High proportion of V1) 
Instrument Saving Market:  INNOVATIVE BANKING (High proportion of V6 and V5) 
Inter-Bank Market:  VERY STRONG DEBTOR POSITION 






Lending Market:  INSTITUTIONAL BANKING (Very high proportion of V3) 
Instrument Saving Market:  TRADITIONAL AND INNOVATIVE BANKING (High proportion of V4 and V5) 
Inter-Bank Market:   VERY STRONG DEBTOR POSITION 







Lending Market:  COMMERCIAL BANKING (High proportion of V1) 
Instrument Saving Market:  INNOVATIVE BANKING (High proportion of V6 and V5) 
Inter-Bank Market:  STRONG DEBTOR POSITION 






Lending Market:  INSTITUTIONAL BANKING (High proportion of V3) 
Instrument Saving Market:  INNOVATIVE BANKING (High proportion of V6) 
Inter-Bank Market:  STRONG CREDITOR POSITION 






Lending Market:  INSTITUTIONAL BANKING (High proportion of V3) 
Instrument Saving Market:  HIGHLY INNOVATIVE BANKING (High proportion of V5) 
Inter-Bank Market:  STRONG CREDITOR POSITION 






Lending Market:  INSTITUTIONAL BANKING (High proportion of V3) 
Instrument Saving Market:  HIGHLY INNOVATIVE BANKING (High proportion of V6) 
Inter-Bank Market:   WEAK CREDITOR POSITION 






Lending Market:  COMMERCIAL and INSTITUTIONAL BANKING (High proportion of V1 and V3) 
Instrument Saving Market:  HIGHLY INNOVATIVE BANKING (High proportion of V6 and V5) 
Inter-Bank Market:   STRONG DEBTOR POSITION 
Number of branch offices:  HIGH               Type of customers:  LARGE BUSINESS 
(a) Figures between brackets refer to the mean number of banks per year.  
(b) Figures between parentheses refer to the mean percentage of bank extinctions. 
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